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EMINENT DOMAIN-DE FACTO TAKING-EASEMENTS-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when an easement has
been ambiguously granted, the grantee has a right to make any
reasonable and necessary use of the land and is not limited by
the grantee's subsequent agreement, use, or acquiescence of the
land.
Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 657 A.2d 920
(Pa. 1995).
In 1958, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation
("Transco") acquired a pipeline right-of-way over property owned
by Serfas Lumber Company ("Serfas") in Ross Township, Monroe
County, Pennsylvania.1 Transco and Serfas entered into a
written agreement setting forth terms and conditions of the
right-of-way.2 Pursuant to the agreement, Transco cleared a
one-hundred-foot-wide right-of-way and constructed its first
pipeline in August of 1958.' A second pipeline was constructed
1. Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 657 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.
1995). Transco owns and constructs pipelines in several states for the purpose of
transporting natural gas in interstate commerce. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 922.
2. Id. The relevant portions of the agreement read as follows:
[Grantor] does hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto TRANSCONTI-
NENTAL GAS PIPELINE CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, its succes-
sors and assigns, . . . a right of way and easement for the purposes of laying,
constructing, maintaining, operating, repairing, altering, replacing, and remov-
ing pipelines ....
There is included in this grant the right, from time to time, to lay, construct,
maintain, operate, alter, repair, remove, change the size of, and replace one or
more additional lines of pipe approximately parallel with the first pipeline laid
by the Grantee hereunder ....
The Grantee shall have all other rights and benefits necessary for the full
enjoyment or use of the rights herein granted, including, but without limiting
the same to, the free and full rights of ingress, egress, and regress over and
across said lands and other lands of the grantor to and from said right from
time to time to cut and remove all trees, undergrowth and other obstructions
that may injure, endanger, or interfere with the construction, operation, main-
tenance and repair of said pipelines....
Grantee agrees to bury said pipelines below normal plow depth and to pay for
physical harm to growing crops, timber, fences, or other structural . . . im-
provements caused by construction, operation, repairing, alteration, or replace-
ment or removal of said pipelines and appurtenant facilities.
Id. (quoting the agreement between Serfas and Transco) (alteration in original).
3. Id.
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by Transco in August of 1971, 4 and a third in 1991.' During the
construction of the third pipeline, Transco cleared an additional
thirty feet of woods adjacent to the original one-hundred-foot-
wide right-of-way.6
The Zettlemoyers acquired the property from Serfas by
separate deeds in December of 1985 and January of 1988.' On
July 3, 1991, the Zettlemoyers filed a petition for the
appointment of viewers' in the Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County, alleging that the clearing of the additional
thirty feet, during the construction of the third pipeline,
constituted a de facto condemnation9 requiring additional
compensation."1
A Board of Viewers was appointed by the court of common
pleas, and Transco filed preliminary objections to the
appointment." After considering Transco's objections, the court
of common pleas dismissed the Zettlemoyers' petition for an
appointment of viewers, and held that the clearing of a one-
4. Id. The second pipeline was built twenty-five feet from the first pipeline.
Id.
5. Id. All three pipelines were constructed within the first one-hundred-foot-
wide right-of-way which was maintained by Transco on the property since 1958. Id.
6. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 922. Transco maintained that it was necessary to
clear the additional area so that construction equipment could safely maneuver in
constructing the third pipeline. Id.
7. Id. The Zettlemoyers took title to the property subject to Transco's right-
of-way. Id.
8. Id. The petition for the appointment of viewers was filed pursuant to Sec-
tion 1-502 of the Eminent Domain Code which reads, in pertinent part: "The
Condenmee may file a petition requesting the appointment of viewers . . . to ascer-
tain just compensation." Id. at 923 n.1 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(a)(6)
(1995)).
9. Id. at 923. A de facto condemnation takes place whenever "the entity
clothed with the power of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of the
use and enjoyment of his property." Id. (citing Redevelopment Auth. v. Woodrung,
445 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1982)). A board of viewers is comprised of "persons appointed
by a court to make an investigation of certain matters . . . and to report to the
court the result of their inspection, with their opinion on the same." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1568 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923-24.
11. Id. at 923 (citing Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., No.
2722 Civ. 1991, slip op. at 6 (C.P. Monroe Cty. Feb. 20, 1992), rev'd, 617 A.2d 51
(Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 657 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1995)). Preliminary objections were
filed pursuant to Section 1-504 of the Eminent Domain Code, which provides in
pertinent part:
Any objection to the appointment of viewers not theretofore waived may be
raised by preliminary objections filed within twenty days after the receipt of
notice of the appointment of viewers. Objections to the form of the petition or
the appointment or the qualifications of the viewers are waived unless includ-
ed in preliminary objections. The court shall determine promptly all prelimi-
nary objections and make such orders and decrees as justice shall require.
Id. at 923 n.2 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-504 (1995)).
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hundred-and-thirty-foot-wide area was the minimum area
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the right-of-way. 2
The Zettlemoyers appealed to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania." The commonwealth court reversed the court of
common pleas and held that, because the easement was
maintained at a one-hundred-foot width for thirty-three years,
this had the effect of establishing the extent of the agreement.
14
Therefore, the court held that the additional clearance by
Transco constituted a de facto condemnation of the Zettlemoyers'
land, necessitating compensation."
Transco appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which granted allocatur 5  to determine whether Transco
committed a de facto condemnation of the Zettlemoyers' land by
clearing an additional thirty feet beyond the one-hundred-foot-
wide right-of-way that had been maintained on the Zettlemoyers'
land by Transco since 1958.17 The supreme court opined that
the clearing of additional land by Transco was necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the easement and, as such, was within the
rights granted by the easement. 8
The supreme court began its analysis with an
acknowledgment that when the width of an easement has been
unequivocally specified in a grant, an easement may not be
expanded beyond that size, even though such width would not
facilitate the grantee's purposes and enjoyment. 9 However, the
court noted, if the terms of an agreement are unclear in
specifying the width of an easement, prior Pennsylvania cases
have indicated that an initial inquiry should include a
determination of whether the parties intended the asserted use
of the land."0 The court stated that once that determination has
12. Zettlemoyer, No. 2772 Civ. 1991, slip op. at 6.
13. Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 617 A.2d 51 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 657 Ak2d 920 (Pa. 1995).
14. Zettlemoyer, 617 A.2d at 51.
15. Id. The court relied on Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Reigart, 193
A. 311 (Pa. 1937) (holding that parties to a deed granting a right-of-way without
specifying its width may establish the width by subsequent use and acquiescence).
Id. at 54.
16. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923. Allocatur is a word used to denote that a
writ or order is allowed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923. The court granted allocatur because the deci-
sion of the commonwealth court conflicted with a prior decision by the common-
wealth court, Bowers v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 611 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992), which held that a pipeline company is not limited to its original
clearing of a right-of-way if additional clearing would be necessary and reasonable
for the installation of additional pipelines. Id.
18. Id. at 924.
19. Id.
20. Id. See, e.g., Taylor v. Heffner, 58 A.2d 450 (Pa. 1948) (holding that when
1996
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been made, it must be shown that the asserted use is reasonable
and necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant.2'
The court next examined the written agreement between the
parties to ascertain their intent. 2 Based on the clear language
of the agreement, the court held that Transco was granted the
right to construct the third pipeline across the Zettlemoyers'
land.23 Further, even though the language of the grant was
ambiguous in specifying the width of the easement, the court
held that the agreement indicated that the parties intended to
permit Transco to clear additional land if it would be reasonable
and necessary to effectuate the purpose of the agreement.24
Addressing the issue of whether the additional clearing was,
in fact, reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the
agreement, the court held that the record supported the
conclusion that clearing an additional thirty feet was a
reasonable action by Transco and was necessary to facilitate the
construction of the third pipeline." The court reasoned that
because the purpose of the agreement was to facilitate the
the grant of an easement is unrestricted, the grantee is given such rights as are
necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the property granted);
Hammond v. Hammond, 101 A. 855 (Pa. 1917) (holding that a grantee of an unde-
fined right-of-way has the right to do whatever is necessary in order to make the
right-of-way usable for the purposes named in the grant). The intent of the parties
is ascertained "by a fair interpretation and construction of the grant and may be
shown by the words employed, construed with reference to the circumstances known
to the parties at the time the grant was made." Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 924.
21. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 924.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court cited the language in the agreement that stated: "[I]ncluded
in this grant [is] the right from time to time . . . [t]o construct . . . one or more
additional lines of pipe approximately parallel with the first pipe." Id.
24. Id. at 925. As evidence of the parties' apparent contemplation of the possi-
bility of the need to clear additional land when constructing pipelines, the court
cited to the portion of the agreement that provided a remedy for "any physical dam-
age to growing crops, timber, fences, or other structural . . . improvements caused
by construction." Id. The court also referenced the portion of the agreement which
granted to Transco "all other rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full
enjoyment or use of the rights herein granted, including ... the right from time to
time to cut and remove all trees, undergrowth, and other obstructions that may
injure, endanger, or interfere with the construction . . . of said pipeline." Id.
25. Id. The trial court determined that the width of the area cleared by
Transco was the minimum area necessary for the full use and enjoyment of the
easement. Id. (citing Zettlemoyer, No. 2772 Civ. 1992, slip op. at 6). The court's
holding was based on Transco's contention that it was necessary to clear an addi-
tional thirty feet in order to safely maneuver its construction equipment during the
construction of the third pipeline. Id. Expert testimony was introduced by Transco
that confirmed that the additional clearing was, in fact, necessary to prevent con-
struction equipment from operating on top of the two existing pipelines and to pre-
vent dirt from being piled on top of the two existing pipelines during the construc-
tion of the third pipeline. Id.
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construction of gas pipelines across the property owned by the
Zettlemoyers, denying Transco the right to clear additional land
necessary to fulfill that purpose would defeat Transco's intent."
Finally, the court addressed the Zettlemoyers' contention that
Transco had conclusively established the width of the right-of-
way by maintaining it at a width of one hundred feet since
1958.27 The court dismissed this argument, holding that
subsequent agreement, use, and acquiescence" of an easement
does not, as a matter of law, establish the width of the easement
when a written agreement between the parties does not
expressly set forth the terms of the easement.29 The court
supported its holding by citing prior case law which had
consistently held that in cases involving ambiguously expressed
easements, the width of an easement is determined by the
parties' intended purpose of the grant, not by subsequent
agreement, use or acquiescence of the land."0 The court also
held that although a grantee's subsequent use and acquiescence
has some evidentiary value as to the parties' intent or the
purpose of the grant, the grantee has the right to make any
reasonable and necessary use of an easement, provided that
such use is within the purpose of the easement and the parties'
original intent.3 1
The court declared that, in the instant case, the language of
the agreement was clearer evidence of the parties' intent than
Transco's subsequent use and acquiescence. 2 The court based
its finding on the specific language of the agreement, which
granted Transco the right to build and maintain additional
26. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 925.
27. Id. In effect, the Zettlemoyers argued that because Transco had
maintained the easement at a one-hundred-foot width since 1958, the easement was
permanently limited to such width, and any attempt by Transco to widen the ease-
ment would result in a de facto taking of the Zettlemoyers' property. Id.
28. Id. The "subsequent agreement, use, and acquiescence" argument was
based on the theory that when a right-of-way is expressly granted, but its exact size
is not specified in the grant, the parties may determine the limits by the use of the
land after the grant is made. Zettlemoyer, 617 A.2d at 53.
29. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 925.
30. Id. See Lease v. Doll, 403 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1979) (holding that failure to im-
mediately use an easement to its fullest extent does not limit the scope of the ease-
ment); Hammond v. Hammond, 101 A. 855 (Pa. 1917); Bowers v. Myers, 85 A. 860
(Pa. 1912) (holding that the fact that a grantee had used a right-of-way for one
purpose for many years did not restrict its use to that purpose only).
31. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 926.
32. Id. The court also rejected the Zettlemoyers' contention that permitting
additional clearance of land would grant Transco permission to clear away all of
their land. Id. The court did so by emphasizing that the holding in this case would
limit Transco to actions that were reasonable and necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the agreement within the parties' original intent. Id.
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pipelines, provided a remedy for any damage to the surrounding
areas as a result of the construction of additional pipelines and
the right to remove trees and other growth in order to facilitate
construction of pipelines. 3
The supreme court reversed the commonwealth court. 4 The
court reinstated the decision of the trial court, holding that the
clearing of the additional land by Transco was within the rights
granted in the easement because Transco's actions were
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the easement.35
The development of the law of easements, granted expressly
by deed, but undefined in terms of location and size, began with
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kraut's
Appeal.36 In Kraut's Appeal, the supreme court addressed the
issue of whether a grantee of an undefined easement can
establish the limits of the grant by subsequent agreement, use
and acquiescence. 7  In Kraut's Appeal, a property owner
conveyed an unspecified right-of-way over his "remaining
ground" to John Kraut ("Kraut") in order to facilitate the
removal of filth from Kraut's privy.3" Kraut had originally used
a vacant portion of the property owner's "remaining land" to
carry the filth from his privy, but this portion was subsequently
conveyed by the property owner to another party.39 In order to
assist Kraut, the property owner opened a passage through his
house which Kraut used twice for removing the filth from the
privy." After the property owner's death, Matthew Craig
("Craig") obtained title to the land occupied by the property
33. Id.
34. Id. at 927.
35. Id.
36. 71 Pa. 64 (1872).
37. Kraut's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 67-68.
38. Id. at 66. Part of the property owner's "remaining ground" was vacant and
part was occupied by a house in which the property owner lived. Id. The precise
language of the deed granted Kraut a passage "through, over and across the
grantor's remaining ground ... with the grantor's knowledge and consent and in
exercise of the privilege granted to the grantee for the purpose of conveying
filth . . . into the street." Id. A privy is defined as "a small often detached building
having a bench with one or more round or oval holes through which the user may
defecate or urinate, and ordinarily lacking any means of automatic discharge of the
matter deposited." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1805 (3d ed. 1986).
39. Kraut's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 68. The conveyance was made with a covenant
of special warranty, without the burden of the right-of-way previously granted by the
property owner to Kraut. Id. A covenant of special warranty is a clause of warranty
inserted in a deed by which the grantor covenants, for himself and his heirs, to
"warrant and forever defend" the title to the same, to the grantee and his heirs,
against all persons claiming "by, through, or under" the grantor or his heirs.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1589 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Kraut's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 66.
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owner's house.4 Kraut had not used the passage through the
house after Craig obtained title to the land, and was denied such
use by Craig when he finally attempted to do so. 2
The supreme court held that when a right-of-way has been
expressly granted, but its exact location and size are not
specified in the grant, the intent of the parties in establishing
the grant is controlling.' The court initially determined that a
reasonable reading of the parties' intent indicated that the right-
of-way should be exercised over the vacant portion of the land
and not the portion occupied by a residence." However, the
court further held that the parties could ultimately define the
location and size of a right-of-way by subsequent agreement, use
and acquiescence.' Therefore, the court opined that because a
vacant portion of the land had been conveyed without the
burden of reservations or conditions, the property owner clearly
intended that the vacant portion of the land be discharged from
the burden of the right-of-way." In addition, the court noted
that Kraut had ceased to use the vacant land as a passage and
had, instead, used the passage created by the property owner
through the house as a path on which to carry the filth. 7 The
court held that this subsequent use defined the location and size
of the right-of-way, and therefore Kraut retained a passage
through the house in order to fulfill the purpose of the grant.'
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
however, rejected the "subsequent agreement, use, and
acquiescence" argument set forth in Kraut's Appeal. In Benner v.
Junker,"' the supreme court addressed the issue of whether a
grantee's use of an easement is limited to its original use or
41. Id. Craig received title to the land through sale and conveyance from the
property owner. Id.
42. Id. at 65. Craig had been in the possession of the land for over ten years,
during which time Kraut had failed to use the passage through the house for the
removal of filth. Id. at 66. Craig denied that the prior property owner made a pas-
sage for Kraut to carry the filth through the house he now owned. Id. at 65. Fur-
ther, Craig claimed that the words of the deed "over and across the remaining
ground" did not give Kraut the right to carry the filth through the house. Id.
43. Id. at 67. The court determined that the parties' intent is to be ascer-
tained from the general terms of the grant, the condition of the ground at the date
of the deed, and reasonable construction and inferences. Id-
44. Id.
45. Kraut's Appeal, 71 Pa. at 68.
46. Id. The burden would then necessarily be placed upon the remaining por-
tion of land to which the property owner retained title. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 43 A. 72 (Pa. 1899).
1996
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whether an easement can be used in any reasonable manner."
In Benner, the parties jointly owned a piece of property
comprised of two lots on which two houses were erected."' The
houses were separated by an alley three-feet in width. 2 The
house on Samuel Benner's ("Benner") lot had always been used
as a residence.53 The house on Jules Junker's ("Junker")
property had been used as a residence for almost forty years
until Junker's father established a bakery in the structure.'
Benner sought to enjoin Junker from using the alley for the
business purpose of loading and unloading delivery wagons."
The supreme court held that because the deed to the property
contained no restrictions as to the use of the alley, the parties
could make any reasonable use of the alley, as long as the use
was in furtherance of the original purpose of the grant.55 In
this case, the court opined that the original intent of the parties
was to create a common passageway for the occupants of both
lots.57 Further, the court noted that although both lots had
originally been maintained as residences, it would be
unreasonable to assume that the alley could only be used as a
convenience for those who maintained residences on the land.'
The court held that a reasonable interpretation of the grant
would permit the use of the alley to facilitate the convenience
for those who attempted to make any other use of the land."
In Hammond v. Hammond,"0 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether a grantee of an
undefined right-of-way has the right to do whatever is necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the easement as named in the grant."s
50. Benner, 43 A. at 73.
51. id.
52. Id. The parties held joint title to the property on which both of their
houses were built, but the deed to the land did not mention the alley. Id. The alley
was located on an equal portion of each party's land, such that neither party had
more access to the alley than the other. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Benner, 43 A. at 72. Benner claimed that the process of loading and un-
loading wagons created noise and confusion, often awakening him from his sleep. Id.
Benner also complained of the smell from the horses which pulled the delivery wag-
ons. Id.
56. Id. The court limited its holding by stating that although Junker could use
the property in any reasonable manner, such use could not prevent Benner from
exercising his own right of reasonable use. Id. at 73.
57. Id. at 72-73.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 101 A. 855 (Pa. 1917).
61. Hammond, 101 A. at 856.
Vol. 34:739
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In Hammond, Martin Hammond (the "father"), the owner of a
large farm, conveyed by deed a portion of his farm to Philip
Hammond (the "son"). 2 Because the premises conveyed were
landlocked, the father also conveyed to the son a right-of-way
over a creek owned by the father in order to have access to a
public road. 3 The language of the deed did not include any
limits on the use of the easement.' Twenty-one years after the
conveyance, the son built a bridge across the creek as a means of
safer and quicker passage.' Shortly thereafter, a flood
occurred, and the son's bridge obstructed the flow of water and
resulted in damage to the father's premises.6
In addressing the issue of whether the son had a right to
build a bridge across the creek, the court held that a grantee of
an undefined right-of-way has the right to do whatever is
necessary in order to make the right-of-way usable for the
purposes named in the grant.s7 Based upon the language in the
deed, the court determined that the clear intent of the grant was
to provide a safe and convenient access to a public road for the
residents of the land, and a bridge was necessary to fulfill that
purpose." Further, the court determined that the fact that a
bridge was not built by the son immediately after the
conveyance did not mean that the son was precluded from doing
so at a later date, if such action furthered the original purpose
of the grant."
In 1937, in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Reigart,7" the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether
parties to a deed, in which a right-of-way was expressly granted
but not defined in terms of location and size, may define such
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The language of the deed provided: "[Tlhe said Philip A. Hammond, his
heirs and assigns, is to have the free and uninterrupted use, liberty, and privilege of
a road twenty feet in breadth from the said premises across the creek to the public
road, now, hereafter, and forever." Id.
65. Id. Prior to the erection of the bridge, the only means of crossing the
creek were by buggy, horseback, or use of a log foot-bridge. Id. These methods of
passage were unsafe and often difficult in times of flooding. Id.
66. Hammond, 101 A. at 856.
67. Id. at 856-57. The court stated that had the father wanted to limit the
grant in such a way as to exclude the building of a bridge, he could have done so
by changing the words of the grant. Id. at 856.
68. Id. at 856.
69. Id. The court held that neither the fact that the bridge did not exist at
the time of the conveyance, nor the fact that the son managed to access the public
road for twenty-one years without a bridge was controlling. Id.
70. 193 A. 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937).
1996
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limitations by subsequent agreement, use, and acquiescence.7'
In Reigart, Mathias Reigart ("Reigart") granted to the
Pennsylvania Water & Power Company (the "power company") a
right-of-way for the construction and maintenance of lines used
for the transmission of electrical current.72 According to the
terms of the grant, only one utility tower was to be built on the
property.73 The tower was built shortly after the grant was
made and maintained on the land for over twelve years.7" In
1935, however, the power company installed a system of
lightning arresters75 on the land which extended the right-of-
way twenty-five feet beyond the area that had been used by the
power company for the previous twelve years.76 Despite the
supreme court's holdings in Benner and Hammond, the superior
court held that because the right-of-way was granted in general
terms and without precise location and size limits, the extent
and mode of the use of the right-of-way was fixed by the power
company's subsequent use of the land for twelve years.7
71. Reigart, 193 A. at 313.
72. Id. The pertinent language of the deed set forth the following:
[A] free and uninterrupted right of way on, over, and through said land for
the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating on said right of way a
line or lines for the transmission of electric current, as well as telephone and
telegraph lines; together with all necessary towers, structures, poles, hangers,
wires, cables, attachments and other appliances. The said right of way to be
located by engineers of grantee, his heirs, and assigns.
Id. The deed also granted to the power company a right of entry for the purpose of
.constructing, maintaining and operating the lines, the right to cut or trim trees and
underbrush on the way, and the right to build from time to time on said right of
way such additional transmission, telephone and telegraph lines as [the grantee]
may wish and determine." Id.
73. Id. The tower was to be erected in an area which was specified on a blue-
print that was attached to the deed. Id.
74. Id. The tower was approximately ninety-six feet in height and twenty feet
square at the base. Id. The base of the tower extended ten feet on each side of its
center line. Id. Three cross arms were placed sixty feet from the ground. Id. The
cross arms had a spread of approximately twenty-seven feet, thirteen and one-half
feet on each side of the center line. Id.
75. Id. The lightning arresters consisted of two pairs of wires which were at-
tached to the legs of the tower on each side at a maximum distance of twenty-five
feet from the center line of the right-of-way. Id.
76. Reigart, 193 A. at 313. The power company contended that the lightning
arresters were necessary because the transmission of current was frequently inter-
rupted when the lines were struck by lightning. Id. The lines were struck by
lightning so frequently that there was often an interference with the delivery of cur-
rent. Id. After the wires were installed, the number of interruptions due to lightning
was reduced to a fraction of what it had been previously. Id.
77. Id. at 314. The superior court's holding was based on the decision in
Kraut's Appeal. Id. Although the supreme court's decisions in Benner and Hammond
directly conflicted with that court's holding in Kraut's Appeal, the superior court did
not have to adhere to the test set forth in Benner or Hammond, because neither
Benner nor Hammond expressly overruled Kraut's Appeal. Id. The court held that
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Therefore, the superior court concluded that the installation of
the lightning arresters created an additional burden on the
servient land for which the owner was entitled to
compensation.78
In Lease v. Doll,79 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
addressed the issue of whether a grantee's use of an easement is
limited to the use the grantee had made of the easement in the
past. ° Once again, the court affirmed its position that an
ambiguously granted easement may be used in any reasonable
manner and is not limited by subsequent agreement, use and
acquiescence.81 However, the court expanded its prior holding
and stated that a grantee does not have to make immediate use
of an easement to the fullest extent possible.2 Rather, the
court held that a grantee is entitled to make any reasonable use
of the easement at any time, provided that such use is within
the scope of the parties' intent and the purpose of the grant.83
In Lease, Charles Lease ("Lease") purchased a plot of land
contiguous with John Doll's ("Doll") land.' Lease's land was
completely landlocked, but a deed conveying title to Lease
expressly granted him a right-of-way over Doll's adjoining
land.85 For over twenty years, the right-of-way was used as a
footpath for travelling between Lease's land and a public
road.8 When Lease attempted to prepare the right-of-way for
vehicular use, Doll erected a fence on the property, effectively
limiting the right-of-way to a footpath. 7 The court viewed the
intended use of the easement as the key issue in determining
whether the right-of-way was limited to the area necessary for a
even though the language of the deed was ambiguous, it did not follow that a grant-
ee could use the right-of-way without limitation as to the place or mode of use. Id.
Instead, the court held, once the right granted "has been exercised in a fixed and
definite course, with the full acquiescence and consent of both parties," it may not
be used in a different manner if the grantee so desired. Id.
78. Id.
79. 403 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1979).
80. Lease, 403 A.2d at 558.
81. Id. at 562-63.
82. Id. at 562 n.9.
83. Id. at 564.
84. Id. at 560.
85. Lease, 403 A.2d at 560. A common owner had title to both lots, and had
reserved a portion of the land owned by Doll, enabling the common owner to grant
to Lease the right-of-way over the Doll land. Id. The deed stated: "That the grantees
and their successors may at all times have the right to use [the right-of-way] as an
outlet from the premises hereby conveyed to the public road." Id.
86. Id. Access to Lease's land continued to be by foot, even after motor vehi-
cles were in general use. Id. at 561.
87. Id. at 561. Lease had dumped stones on the existing pathway and its sur-
rounding area, enlarging the pathway to a width sufficient for vehicular use. Id.
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footpath or if the right existed to expand the width of the
easement sufficient for vehicle passage.88 The court determined
that if the width of an easement is not specified in a grant, an
easement would be considered to be of such width as is
necessary and convenient for any reasonable use to
accommodate the intended purpose of the easement.89 The
court noted that because the purpose of the easement was to
provide an outlet from Lease's land to the public road, vehicular
use of the right-of-way was reasonable, even though the right-of-
way had been used only as a footpath in the past.9"
Additionally, the court indicated that the fact that Lease did not
immediately use the easement to its fullest potential did not
diminish the scope of the easement.9
The court's holding in Lease appeared to have the effect of
abrogating the determination of the limits of an ambiguous
easement on the basis of "subsequent agreement, use and
acquiescence."92 According to the court's holding in Lease, a
grantee may, at any time, make any reasonable use of an
easement, provided that such use is in fulfillment of the parties'
intent and the original purpose of the grant. 3
Recently, in Bowers v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.,
94
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue
of how to determine the extent of an ambiguously granted
easement.95 In Bowers, a property owner conveyed an easement
to Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation's ("Texas Eastern")
predecessor in title by deed in 1943 for the purpose of laying a
gas pipeline.9 Shortly after the conveyance, Texas Eastern's
88. Id. at 561 n.5.
89. Id. at 561-62. The court stated that the determination of a reasonable
width should be ascertained by "taking into consideration the character and situation
of the property, the circumstances affecting the use, and the purposes to be served."
Id. at 561 n.5.
90. Lease, 403 A-2d at 562-63. The court based its decision in part on the fact
that such use would not unreasonably interfere with Doll's use of his land and also
on the fact that Lease's land would be rendered useless for all practical purposes if
vehicular traffic was prohibited. Id. at 564.
91. Id. at 562-63 n.9.
92. Id. at 563 n.10.
93. Id. at 561.
94. 611 A.2d 1350 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1992).
95. Bowers, 611 A.2d at 1351-52.
96. Id. at 1351. The grant stated:
[Tihe right to lay, operate, renew, alter, inspect and maintain a pipeline for
the transportation of . . .gas, Grantee selecting the route, upon, over, under
and through the [landowner's total tract of land) and also the right ... to
lay, operate, renew, alter, inspect, and maintain a second pipeline for like
transportation, adjacent to and parallel with the first pipeline; and Grantee at
any and all reasonable times shall have the right to ingress and egress to and
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predecessor in title constructed two pipelines stretching three
tenths of a mile onto the adjacent property owned by the
easement grantor. 7 Over forty years later, Texas Eastern
cleared an additional one hundred and twenty-five feet of the
property owner's land in order to replace one of the original
pipelines with a new pipeline.98 The property owner alleged
that Texas Eastern was limited to the original forty-foot-wide
path used by Texas Eastern and its predecessor in title under
the easement for over forty years.9"
The commonwealth court, consistent with the supreme court's
decisions in Hammond and Lease, rejected the property owner's
argument that when an easement is granted in ambiguous
terms, the easement is limited by use and acquiescence."° The
court held, instead, that when the terms of an easement are
ambiguous, the easement may be used in any manner that is
reasonable and consistent with the original purpose for which
the easement was originally granted.''
Thus, by 1992, the "subsequent agreement, use and
acquiescence" argument appeared to have been replaced by a
"reasonable and necessary" standard in resolving the scope of an
ambiguous easement."2  The "reasonable and necessary"
standard was used to determine the extent of ambiguously
granted easements." 3  However, the commonwealth court's
opinion in Zettlemoyer failed to take into consideration the cases
rejecting the "subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence"
argument, and, instead, held that when a right-of-way is
expressly granted, but its exact dimensions are not set forth in
the grant, the parties may define the dimensions of the right-of-
way by subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence.10
4
Because this decision directly conflicted with the commonwealth
court's holding in Bowers, the supreme court granted allocatur.0 5
from such pipelines ....
Id.
97. Id. The original two pipelines were twenty inches in diameter. Id. A forty-
foot strip of land was maintained by Texas Eastern and its predecessor in title to
provide access to the pipelines. Id.
98. Id. The original grant was made in 1943, and the additional clearing took
place in 1989. Id. The new pipeline was thirty-six inches in diameter, sixteen inches
larger than the original pipeline. Id.
99. Id. at 1351-52.
100. Bowers, 611 A.2d at 1351.
101. Id. at 1352.
102. See Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 926.
103. See Lease, 403 A.2d at 561-62.
104. Zettlemoyer, 617 A.2d at 54 (citing Reigart, 193 A. at 311).
105. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923.
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The supreme court's decision in Zettlemoyer conclusively
establishes the proper test for determining the extent of an
easement when the width of an easement is not specified in the
grant. When a grant of an easement is ambiguous, the
Zettlemoyer opinion makes it clear that the proper test is
whether a grantee's asserted use is a reasonable and necessary
use in relation to the original purpose of the grant and within
the intent of the original parties to the grant.""6
The Zettlemoyer opinion is significant because it effectively
eliminated the "subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence"
test as a means for ascertaining the extent of an easement. As a
result of Zettlemoyer, the value of subsequent agreement, use
and acquiescence has been effectively limited to a mere source of
extrinsic evidence of the parties' original intent and the purpose
of the grant.' 7 This clarification of the proper test was
necessary because the opinions in Kraut's Appeal and Reigart
supported the "subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence"
argument and these opinions had never been expressly
overruled. As a result, these early decisions were still being
cited as a source of authority. While the decisions in Kraut's
Appeal and Reigart remain intact, the court's opinion in
Zettlemoyer appears to have completely rejected the "subsequent
agreement, use and acquiescence" argument, leaving these cases
devoid of any precedential value.
In addition, the test set forth in Zettlemoyer more closely
mirrors the rules of construction that are applicable to easement
grants than did the "subsequent agreement, use and
acquiescence" test.' These rules of construction provide that if
the location and size of an easement are specified in a grant,
then clearly a grantee's use of an easement is limited to the
specifications."° If, however, the language of a granting deed is
ambiguous regarding size and location, then the rules of
construction provide that the intent of the parties as to the
original purpose of a grant is a controlling factor in determining
106. Id. at 924.
107. Id. at 926.
108. Id. The rules of construction that apply to easement grants are the same
rules that apply to the construction of contracts. Id. at 924 (citing Sigal v.
Manufacturer's Light and Heat Co., 299 A.2d 646 (Pa. 1973) (holding that the same
rules of construction that apply to contracts are applicable in the construction of
easement grants) and Percy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 54 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1947) (holding
that canons of construction used in the interpretation of easements are the same
canons used in the interpretation of contracts)).
109. Id. at 924.
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the extent of an easement.'
Thus, while the "subsequent agreement, use and
acquiescence" test ignored the parties' intent and, instead,
focused on the parties' actions, the test set forth in Zettlemoyer
is practically identical to the rules of construction for easement
grants. This close resemblance will favorably result in
consistency among Pennsylvania courts when addressing this
issue.
However, the Zettlemoyer court failed to take into
consideration those cases in which the parties' intent or the
original purpose of a grant is unascertainable. This could be a
frequent occurrence because more likely than not the parties to
this type of action are not the original property owners. Clear
evidence of intent may be difficult to obtain, particularly if the
parties obtained title to the properties in question decades, or
even centuries, after the grant was made. Furthermore, in such
cases the original purpose of a grant may have been outmoded
through the passage of time.
The Zettlemoyer opinion may be used as a basis for a court to
reject a reasonable use of an easement if there is evidence to
show that the use was not the original purpose of an easement.
The "subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence" test would be
a more effective means of determining the extent of an easement
when the parties' intent is not easily ascertainable or if the
original purpose of the easement had been antiquated. Perhaps
in the future the use of the test set forth in Zettlemoyer may be
limited in its application to those cases in which the parties'
intent as to the original purpose of the grant may be easily
determined. When such factors are unable to be determined, the
use of an easement over a long period of time in a particular
manner ought to be a controlling factor. In those instances, the
most equitable remedy may be obtained by the utilization of the
"subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence" test.
Melissa J. Ferragonio
110. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 926.
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